Least core: an efficient and stable participant contribution evaluation mechanism in federated learning

Lin Guopeng; Ni Zhengwei

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2026011

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Least core: an efficient and stable participant contribution evaluation mechanism in federated learning

Research and Development | 更新时间：2026-04-08

- Least core: an efficient and stable participant contribution evaluation mechanism in federated learning
- Telecommunications Science Vol. 42, Issue 3, Pages: 97-112(2026)
- 作者机构：
  
  浙江工商大学信息与电子工程学院，浙江杭州 310018
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  The Tongxiang General Artificial Intelligence Research Institute Project(TAGI2-B-2024-0017)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2026011
  CLC： TN91;TP309
- Received：16 April 2025，
  
  Revised：2025-06-17，
  
  Accepted：17 June 2025，
  
  Published：20 March 2026
- 稿件说明：
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林国鹏,倪郑威.Least core：联邦学习中高效稳定的参与者贡献评价机制[J].电信科学,2026,42(03):97-112.

Lin Guopeng,Ni Zhengwei.Least core: an efficient and stable participant contribution evaluation mechanism in federated learning[J].Telecommunications Science,2026,42(03):97-112.
林国鹏,倪郑威.Least core：联邦学习中高效稳定的参与者贡献评价机制[J].电信科学,2026,42(03):97-112. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2026011.

Lin Guopeng,Ni Zhengwei.Least core: an efficient and stable participant contribution evaluation mechanism in federated learning[J].Telecommunications Science,2026,42(03):97-112. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2026011.

摘要

为了应对数据隐私保护引发的“数据孤岛”问题，联邦学习提供了一种允许多方在不共享原始数据的情况下联合训练模型的技术框架。然而，为了吸引高质量数据拥有者参与并维持系统的长期稳定运行，公平合理的价值评估和收益分配机制至关重要。尽管Shapley值被广泛用于联邦学习中的贡献评估，但其单一性限制了对价值的多维考量。为此，引入最小核心（Least core）方法，通过最小化最大不满度，为价值分配提供新视角。然而，Least core方法的计算复杂性与Shapley值相似，均存在一定的计算限制，需进一步结合多种抽样方式，近似计算分配结果，在显著降低大规模场景下计算成本的同时，确保分配的准确性。实验结果表明，该机制在确保公平性和系统稳定性的同时，有效提升了计算效率，为多样化的联邦学习场景提供了可行的解决方案。

Abstract

To address the “data silo” problem caused by data privacy protection

federated learning offers a technological framework that enables multiple parties to collaboratively train models without sharing raw data. However

to attract high-quality data owners and ensure the long-term stable operation of the system

a fair and reasonable value evaluation and revenue distribution mechanism is essential. Although the Shapley value has been widely used in federated learning for contribution evaluation

relying on a single approach limits the multi-perspective assessment of data contribution and value distribution. For this purpose

the Least core method was introduced

providing a new perspective for value allocation by minimizing the maximum deficit. However

the computational complexity of the Least core method

similar to that of the Shapley value

posed certain computational limitations. By further combining various sampling methods to approximate the allocation results

it significantly reduced the computational cost in large-scale scenarios while ensuring the accuracy of the allocation. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanism ensures fairness and system stability while effectively improving computational efficiency

providing a feasible solution for diverse federated learning scenarios.

关键词

Keywords

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